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“Parleying Culture Against Trade: Hollywood’s Affairs With Korea’s Screen Quotas”
Abstract
The rising Korean cinema has inspired a flurry of new understandings of the nation’s media
and cultural policies. However, there remains a gap in the historical factors leading to this
phenomenon, regarding particularly Hollywood’s long-term negotiations with import and
screen quotas. This study charts Hollywood’s export activities in Korea and analyzes
differences between the US economic approach to film as ‘goods’ and Korean view of films
as ‘cultural expressions’. The Korean government’s perseverance to safeguard film as
cultural heritage and its ability to stand-up against relentless trade pressures from the US have
led to the contemporary Korean cinema’s tangible success. Ironically, a brood of American
films, which flooded Korea after 1988, helped raise this tiger from its slumber and the
subsequent spread of Hallyu the so-called Korean wave, across East Asia and the globe.
Keywords: Korean cinema, global Hollywood, motion pictures, political economy, Korean
studies, screen quota, film policy
Recent flourishing scholarship concerning the rising success of the contemporary Korean
cinema has (re)inscribed Korea’s film history into the world history of national cinemas.
Undoubtedly, there is work to do as evidenced by the glaring omission of Korea in The
Oxford History of World Cinema (Nowell-Smith, 1996). Studies in English such as Lee and
Choe (1998), Lee (2000), James and Kim (2002), Kim (2002), Min, Joo and Kwak (2003),
Kim K. (2004), McHugh and Abelmann (2005), Shin and Stringer (2005), Yi (2005), Yecies
(2005) and Jin (2006) provide fresh understandings of the New Korean Cinema boom – from
both Korean and Western perspectives. Other studies such as Yim (2002) focus on the
complex relationships between cultural identity and cultural policy, while Shim (2006)
among others examines the global phenomenon of Hallyu: the Korean wave. Korea’s
accomplishments in the realms of implementing film policy, developing industry(ies),
protecting culture and experimenting with genres has bequeathed the substance for these
groundbreaking studies. Since the late 1990s, the South Korean (hereafter Korean) cinema
has experienced unprecedented growth at home and across many parts of the globe.
According to the Korean Film Council (KOFIC), 15.9 percent of all films screened in Korea
in 1991 were locally-made films. In less than eight years, the domestic market share more
than doubled to 39.7 percent in 1999 and tripled to 50.1 percent in 2001. Between January
and June 2004 the domestic share of Korean films (ranked by country) reached heights of 62
percent (Jung, 2004), and in 2005 the industry maintained a steady market share of about 50
percent – an extraordinary triumph few other countries have ever achieved in their own
market.1 Awe, respect and appreciation of the Korean cinema have never been higher. The
New South Korean Cinema has ballooned into the hottest pan-Asian film industry, for which
the world has been waiting since the fading of other Asian waves such as Japan (1960s),
Hong Kong (1970s) and China (1980s).
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Large retrospectives have been honored recently at festivals such as Berlin, Cannes, New
York, Toronto and Venice. Celebrating its 11th anniversary in October 2006, Pusan
International Film Festival has become the largest showcase of Asian cinema. American film
companies eagerly have sought remake rights for some of the highest-grossing comedies,
dramas and horror films. Japanese importers are paying never-before-seen prices – between
$3 and $8 million US dollars – for the exhibition rights of Korean films. In 1991 only 17
Korean films were exported while in 2004 distributors enjoyed a massive sales increase of
nearly 200 films to 62 countries.
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The Korean film industry’s thriving activity, undisputed in academic, industry and popular
media circles, contrasts with a sheer void in attention to the historical development of import
quotas, including the Screen Quota System. This article analyzes the detailed chronology of
Korean-American film trade history and argues Korea’s Screen Quota System (hereafter
SQS) has contributed centrally to a contemporary film boom. Hollywood’s remarkable but
understudied pursuit of Korea between the mid-1960s and mid-1990s offers a gripping story
about one country’s film industry pressured by international trade and US film industry
export practices. Over time, despite relevant fears, US free trade policy has not squashed
Korea’s film industry but boosted it. This is significant because it challenges conventional
understandings of Hollywood’s global influence and Korea’s negotiating abilities with
cultural matters. With this in mind, there are lessons to be learned about the economic versus
cultural approach to film within the context of free trade and other bilateral agreements. This
trade history has significant cultural policy implications. Through the development and
protection of film quotas, the Korean government has resisted (and only recently consented)
to Hollywood’s hegemony, that is, the American film industry’s discursive and economic
dominance.2
Studies within film, media and cultural studies such as Jarvie (1992), Higson and Maltby
(1999), Miller (2001) and Schatz (2004) articulate the formation and continuance of
Hollywood’s hegemony. However, few studies inquire how film import quotas in Korea have
limited the distribution and exhibition of foreign – mostly American – films, and how postliberation Korean governments have attempted to control the domestic exhibition market with
the SQS. How have negotiations between the governments and film industry bodies shaped
the landscape of screen quota debates? What price has Korea paid for resisting the
liberalization of its film industry when the Motion Picture Export Association of America
(MPEA) and Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) first introduced the idea in the
late 1960s and again in the mid-1970s and early 1980s? Despite fears of what cultural
diversity advocates consider a US threat to national culture, how has Hollywood ironically
raised this tiger from its slumber? The following analysis of press releases, trade articles,
congressional archive materials, and correspondence between the MPEA, Office of US Trade
Representative (USTR) and US Department of State (US-DOS) demonstrates how
Hollywood’s long-term obsession with the Korean market is a paradoxical attraction: one that
proves a country’s film industry can survive and in-deed outpace Hollywood’s strength as an
exporter of audio/visual ‘goods’ in their own market. Korea’s parleying with Hollywood over
time is an enviable achievement to film industries, arts and cultural advocates, and policymakers across the globe, proving the Korean cinema is worth fighting for.
Birth of the Film Quota
It is true today, as it was yesterday, that reciprocal trade has made the United States the
greatest international trader in the world’s history. The very core of our success is
reciprocity. If we do not buy, we cannot possibly sell. And if we do not sell, no economist
2

Other countries such as Mexico and Taiwan, which have surrendered their screen quota
restrictions, have witnessed a sharp decline in their respective domestic film industries. For
example, in the late 1980s, prior to the Mexican government signing the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA in 1994), the number of Mexican films reached about 100
per year. Yet, after joining NAFTA, the US required Mexico to reduce its film import quotas,
resulting in the apparent decimation of the local production industry. The number of films
produced between 1995-2002 ranged from 14 to 27 – with a record low of 10 in 1998. See
Kim (2003: 89).
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from Adam Smith to John Maynard Keynes could concoct the miracle drugs that would save
our skins. – Eric Johnston (1958: 740), President of MPEA and MPAA
Import quotas in Korea date back to Japanese colonial regulations enacted on 1 August 1918
when numbers of domestic (Korean and Japanese) and foreign films were monitored closely
(Yecies and Shim, 2003). Since the late 1920s, Universal, Paramount, United Artists, MGM
and RKO – controlling members of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors
Association of America (MPPDAA) – directly distributed films in Seoul. Between 1926 and
1936, or the ‘first golden age of American cinema in Korea’ (Yecies, 2005), more than 6,700
American silent and talkie films were submitted to the Government-General of Ch sen
sen’s film
3
censorship apparatus. Musical and gangster/crime films were prolific. The colonial
censorship apparatus approved nearly all of these films with minimal censorship changes.
Films were simply units of trade, and Korea was nurtured as a lucrative market in
Hollywood’s global expansion campaign – at least until the late 1930s when the GovernmentGeneral of Ch sen began banning foreign film imports and controlling the whole of the film
industry in order to serve Japan’s military agenda in the escalating war in North China.
During the War film stock became a valuable raw material and film prints were seen as
ideological agents created and diffused by the ‘enemy’. In June 1945, immediately after
World War II ended, the largest American producer-distributors formed a foreign sales
division of the MPPDAA called the MPEA (MPEA, 1945). The MPEA aimed to increase its
member companies’ foreign revenues, to counter restrictive foreign trade and taxation
barriers, and to spread American ideology (and American-made products) worldwide,
especially in liberated and occupied countries such as Germany, Japan and Korea. Hollywood
distributors were eager to expedite their films back to Korea after Japan squeezed them out
between 1939 and 1945. Restrictive import quotas, which mirrored Japanese colonial
regulations, ceased during the occupying US Army Military Government in Korea
(USAMGIK, 1945-8). During this time, US films were distributed by the Central Motion
Picture Exchange (CMPE), a semi-government organisation that assisted with USAMGIK’s
cultural reorientation program. After 1948, the CMPE began representing MPEA member
companies as their sole commercial distributor. Korean audiences cherished musicals and
slap-stick comedies, but detested violence, mystery and cruelty (Bruns, 1949:2). Although
Korea’s 96 cinemas contained outdated equipment, a brand-new generation of cinemagoers
was born in the post-liberation era. During the Korean War, many cinemas closed in the wake
of destruction, but after the conflict Korea was a “ripe field for American pictures” because,
in the words of one Warner Bros. executive, “the aftermath of war in any country leaves a
great need for relaxation and entertainment” (Cohen, 1953). MPEA’s long-awaited return to
the Korean market had begun, and so too did its troubles resume. Historically, the MPEA has
been successful at toppling trade restrictions in nearly all cases of resistance to Hollywood’s
hegemony inside and outside of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, with notable exceptions of France, Canada
and, of course, Korea.
3

According to archive documents in the United Artists collection at the State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, some of the Warner Bros.–First National Pictures, which received
censorship approval in 1934 and were screened, include: Footlight Parade, Gold Diggers of
1933, Captured, I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang, 42nd Street, Crowd Roars, Winner Take
All, Fashions, Son of a Sailor, Tiger Shark, Central Air Port, Frisco Jenny, Little Giant, and
Last Flight (Series 1F Box 5-5,). These were visually entertaining sound films with narratives
that Korean (and Japanese) audiences easily could appreciate. Hollywood films were not
dubbed into the local language; it was standard practice to add Korean (and/or Japanese)
subtitles and explanatory notes to most prints (Film Daily Year Book of Motion Pictures,
1938).
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Reformation of the Screen Quota, 1961-84
We are free traders. I guess next to John Wayne, Kirk Douglas, and Robert Redford, Adam
Smith is one of our favorite people, at least insofar as a free market is concerned. We believe
that free trade is the only salvation that we are going to have in dealing with countries
around the world. The minute anybody tries to erect trade barriers, there is a viral contagion
effect which spreads all over the world, and suddenly you find yourself faced with all kinds of
problems that you wish you did not have. – Jack Valenti (1977:210), President of the MPEA
and MPAA
Formal and permanent film regulations were enacted by President Park Chung-hee’s
administration in 1962 with the Motion Picture Law (MPL). After decades of regulations left
in place by the Government-General and USAMGIK, this was Korea’s first real post-colonial
film policy and true beginning of a strong proclivity toward state protection of Korean culture
as national treasure. During Park’s military dictatorship (1961-79), the MPL systematized
policies for all producers, distributors and exhibitors, showcasing the government’s preferred
direction for the domestic film industry and the country – namely that of industrialization and
modernization. Though it is difficult to know all of the external factors that influenced the
Ministry of Public Information’s (MPI’s) creation of the MPL, it followed protectionist
quotas enacted by Australia (1936-69), Britain (1948) and West Germany (early 1950s), and
set a trend for countries such as Argentina (1962-3), Japan (1964), Italy (1965), and France
and Spain (1960s-1970s) (Schnitman, 1984; Moran, 1994). In January 1965 Korea’s Ministry
of Commerce and Industry revealed Public Notice No. 3297, regulating the importation of
foreign films, among other commodities. Foreign film rentals were limited to a total of
$75,000 US dollars per fiscal quarter (US-DOS, 1965), hampering theoretically-reciprocal
trade between the US and Korea.
Korea’s contemporary SQS originated directly from the MPL, which in 1966 required every
cinema to exhibit domestic films for a minimum of 90 days each year – guaranteeing screen
time but not box-office performance. The MPI further protected the distribution and
exhibition of Korean films by establishing an annual quota, often referred to as an embargo,
of imported films. Import quotas were established at the onset of each year, limiting the
number of foreign films screened annually to about one-third of domestic films. In this way,
the Park government widened the Korean cinema as part of the country’s larger cultural
sector. Throughout the 1960s, the MPEA via the US-DOS monitored Korean trade
regulations with continued interest. By this time, Korea was one of 70 markets that MPEA
member companies had their eyes on, and one of 117 countries where American films were
shown.
Jack Valenti, one of the primary protagonists in this study, became the President of the
MPEA and MPAA (formerly the MPPDAA) in 1966, the same year Korea’s SQS was born.
The MPEA benefited greatly from the appointment of Valenti because of his political
experience with the White House, dating back to John F. Kennedy’s administration. Valenti
had friends in high places. On 1 June 1966 Jack Valenti resigned as Special Assistant to
President Lyndon B. Johnson and accepted the top position in the MPAA. Though he was no
longer working in the White House, Valenti’s new position kept him in frequent contact with
President Richard M. Nixon and former President Johnson. Income generated from foreign
markets around this time represented about half of Hollywood’s total film rental income. The
magnitude of the MPEA and Valenti’s job reflected the size of the organization – more than
700 foreign offices employed over 16,000 people. No other industry in the US systematically
equipped itself with this level of foreign intelligence, utilizing a ‘sharp-edged industry
intelligence system’ with ‘swift communication’ to data-mine any and all information
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impacting on the distribution and exhibition of US films (Valenti, 1968: 2). During his 38year reign as President of the MPAA-MPEA (1966-2004), Valenti created a mini State
Department, utilizing field offices throughout the world to negotiate directly with highranking government, non-government and film industry leaders. Negotiations also occurred
on American soil, lobbying various arms of the US government to prolong economic and
trade agreements with countries like Korea until they consented to annihilate import barriers
to the US film industry.
By 1968 the US-DOS began seeing Korea as a ‘promising and challenging’ market and the
‘surprise package of the Far East’ because its imports had reached almost one billion dollars
(US-DOS, 1968). Korea was rapidly becoming a viable market for goods manufactured in the
US. Despite the concrete limitations on the distribution and exhibition of foreign films
mentioned above, Valenti continued to seek consent from the Korean government to directly
distribute American films in Korea; the MPEA desired liberal access to the Korean market
just as it desired liberal access to all other foreign markets. At the same time, the MPEA
wanted Korea to reduce the incidence of film smuggling and piracy. Countries such as Korea,
Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, China and India were thought not to be enforcing international
copyright laws, and US film, television, video, computer software, book publishing and
music industries apparently were losing millions of dollars (US-DOS, 1973; Weiler 1975). In
order to achieve further market penetration, the MPEA needed to topple Korea’s robust trade
barriers, which in 1965 allowed only 53 imported films. Hence, Valenti began urging, that is,
lobbying the US-DOS to intensify its support of the American film industry.
MPEA member companies were dissatisfied with some of the ‘unauthorized’ Korean ways of
conducting business. In particular, a number of import licenses, which the MPL issued on a
quota basis, were being sold to non-approved importers on the so-called black market for
around $20,000 to $30,000 US dollars (Variety, 1966: 143). Import licenses were precious
because they provided Korean producers and exhibitors with valuable opportunities to make a
load of money from screening US films, which were extremely popular during the 1960s. The
Park government treated import licenses as a valuable commodity, awarding them to
producers whose top films won domestic and international awards, or whose annual output
reached the highest levels. The MPEA complained that the unofficial and seemingly liberal
exchange or trading of import licenses between Korean producers circumvented the MPL. On
the one hand, correcting the ‘deficiencies’ of the film law probably required better policing.
On the other hand, Korean producers, directors and ministerial officials simply accepted that
a percentage of film business was conducted in this way. However, in reality, this practice
probably changed the players on the ground too swiftly, making it difficult for the MPEA to
maximize the smooth and regular exhibition of US films in a tightly-controlled policy
environment. At any rate, the MPEA was fixed on smashing the monopoly of film
importation and control of print rental prices held by a small number of dealers –
government-licensed production companies in the Korean Film Producers Association. The
MPEA needed a man on the inside.
Between 1968 and 1970, while serving as the International Relations Officer for the United
Nations Command/United States Forces Korea, Mr. Cha Yun was hired by the MPEA as its
primary local representative (Cha, 2003). As the liaison between the MPEA and Korean
government, it was Mr. Cha’s role to convince the Park administration of the long-term
benefits of liberalizing the film market and opening it up to more US films. In his
negotiations, Mr. Cha proposed: non-transferable import licenses for film distributors, annual
import of at least 100 US films, a local MPEA office in Korea, and payment in local currency
(Won) if and when dollars were not available (US-DOS, 1970). Both Valenti and Mr. Cha
knew that this request would come with a price, but the MPEA was willing to pay for these
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things because they guaranteed increased access to the large audiences of what McHugh and
Abelmann (2005) have called Korea’s golden age of melodrama cinema. In order to sweeten
negotiations the MPEA proposed to divert a percentage of its profits to the Korean film
industry and to offer Korean filmmakers technical training, helping the local industry develop
global standards. One key negotiating strategy for getting the government on side was
offering to donate funds to Park Chung-hee’s pet May 16 Scholarship Foundation. To his
credit, Mr. Cha maintained that the liberalization of the Korean film industry, that is, the
development of efficiency as well as an increase in the number of imported US films, would
lead to greater competition and quality of Korean films. As discussed shortly, we now know
that these flow-on effects were entirely possible because they have in fact happened.
Throughout the late 1960s, the Ministry of Culture and Public Information (MCPI) –
formerly known as the Ministry of Public Information – was amicable toward MPEA
concerns, agreeing in principle to most requests. Further, the MCPI expressed urgency about
holding a new round of negotiations to explore avenues for technical and export training for
the domestic film industry. As Shim (2006) observes, Korean popular culture had minimal
export facility before the late 1990s. Increasing Korea’s film exports from the 1960s was seen
as a proactive strategy for cultural development and expansion of the Korean cinema. During
this time, US films were first imported to offices in Japan and then inefficiently re-negotiated
by middlemen for the Korean market. In other words, Korean importers were unable to deal
directly with MPEA member companies. An MPEA office in Seoul would streamline the
distribution process, and potentially offer importers lower print rental prices – at least this
was the golden carrot the MPEA dangled in front of the Korean government. In turn, foreign
currency consumption could be lowered, and redirected towards the development of the
domestic film industry. However, the MCPI failed to see the rationale behind importing
upwards of 100 US films per year. We may never know if President Park fully trusted the
MPEA, or if he believed Koreans were prepared socially and culturally to be inundated
further with ideology found in American films. In any case, Park maintained the spirit of the
MPL, which protected the Korean film industry from the inside by rewarding productivity
and anti-communism and propaganda genre films. Yet, in 1970, albeit for a short time, the
MCPI unexpectedly reduced the required screening days for domestic films to a minimum of
30, which probably appeased the MPEA. When the MPEA decided to get tough with foreign
markets around this time, Korea was overlooked because the playing field for Hollywood
films was sufficiently level. In June 1971, on behalf of the MPEA, President Nixon
established the Council on International Economic Policy Operations Group, which
developed the “Action Program to Assist the Motion Picture Industry” and sent high-level
delegations to foreign markets (The White House, 1971). The program demonstrated
President Nixon’s commitment to intensifying GATT discussions concerning trade barriers to
the US film industry, and to influencing bilateral trade agreements involving the Invisibles
Code, a guideline that aimed to liberalize the film trade and expand rental income of US films
in foreign markets. Valenti was using his sphere of influence to persuade the US government
to punish countries with hostile and/or prohibitive film quotas. Britain was the first target
because it was the largest market for English language films. Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
France, Italy, Spain and Turkey followed because they were all markets in the early 1970s
that failed to offer favourable tariffs to US films.
In 1973 revisions to the MPL facilitated the formation of the Korean Motion Picture
Promotion Corporation (KMPPC) – a non-profit film industry support organization – as a
way of further developing the film industry. The total number of imported films dropped
from 60 in 1973 to 39 in 1974. For the first time, Koreans had a semi-autonomous national
film industry body of their own. Under the new law, the MCPI increased screening days of
domestic films to a minimum of 121 days, guaranteeing a one-third screening ratio of
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domestic to foreign films. This bold attempt to protect the local cinema resisted potentiallyunwanted advances from American film interests, suggesting President Park’s anti-American
attitude. All the same, government and film industry representatives could not agree on a
single approach to protect the domestic market and limit imports. As discussed shortly, the
MPEA exploited these internal incongruities. Throughout the middle and late 1970s the
Korean film industry experienced a dark period of inactivity – inversely linked to its
productivity in the 1960s, which enabled Park to boast Korea had a robust domestic film
industry. However, an overabundance of ‘quota quickies’ eventually led to a sharp decline in
quality, plunging the Korean cinema into a so-called dark age. Korea left MPEA’s radar
screens for the time being because the distribution market had shrunk significantly within this
larger downturn; only between 31 and 43 foreign films were imported annually. Back in the
US other looming issues were drawing MPEA’s attention; Valenti (1976) focused on carving
out a promising future for American films on cable TV. In 1979, President Park was
assassinated, and negotiations between Korea and the US government and MPEA lulled.
Nevertheless, advancing opportunities for imported films, including direct distribution,
remained a concern for the MPEA.
During General Chun Doo-hwan’s presidency (1980-8), Korea’s cultural approach to film
reached new heights as the government attempted to uplift and protect the arts, and as Yim
(2002: 40) observes, to forge a new cultural identity. In 1981 the number of required
screening days for domestic films was raised to a minimum of 165 days – Korea’s highest
quota yet. According to statistics found in Korean Cinema, the total number of all foreign
film imports between 1982 and 1984 was minimal – recorded as 23-7 per year. US
distributors’ frustration elevated to a new peak, and a turning point occurred within larger
US-Korea trade relations. By making the restriction of US films an issue of blocking
economic trade, the MPEA aligned its campaign with the US government’s counter-trade
restrictive policies. Korea was now on the MPEA’s hit list, which jeopardized bilateral trade
talks between US and Korea. The Korean government took careful notice. In July 1984,
Screen International reported the Korean government was terminating its film import quota
while liberalising the domestic production system. The announcement had a timely effect –
lifting the foreign film embargo potentially placated the MPEA and simultaneously increased
Korea’s chances of maintaining ‘Normal Trade Relations’ (NTR) status (formerly known as
Most Favored-Nation status) with the US. Chun’s government was about to sacrifice part of
the Korean film industry in order to guarantee lower tariffs for Korean autos, computer parts,
and telecommunications equipment when entering the US. Pouncing on Korea with new
might, the MPEA went further than trying to lift the foreign film embargo.
Culture Between the Trade Wars, 1985-8
… if you will pardon me reaching to a great Hollywood script writer named William
Shakespeare, I would let him set the theme for what I am about to say to you very briefly. In
Richard II, Shakespeare has the King cry out in anguish: ‘For God’s sake, let us sit upon the
ground and tell sad stories of the death of kings, let us talk of graves and worms and
epitaphs.’ Mr. Chairman, unless this Congress with some unshakable resolve shoves some
steel in the spine of our trade laws and makes them stick, we will soon be telling sad stories
of the death of our export trades, and we will have the gloomy task of composing our own
epitaphs. – Jack Valenti (1986: 989)
On 11 September 1985, after more than a decade of paltry numbers of imported films, MPEA
member companies stepped up the fight against Korea’s screen quotas by filing a formal
complaint with the USTR under Section 301 of the US Trade Act (San Francisco Chronicle,
1985). This procedure was invoked in situations in which a foreign policy or practice
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restricted US commerce, giving the US President power to penalize any country failing to
open or to liberalize its markets for US commodities. The USTR, which develops trade
policies between the US and foreign nations, welcomed MPEA’s claims of ‘unreasonable’
and ‘discriminatory’ limitations on film distribution because its core job was to open world
markets for US goods and services. Amid its victimization cries the MPEA reiterated its
demands: increased numbers of imported (US) films, liberalization of import and rental
licenses, establishment of direct distribution offices, reduced cash deposits (less than
$800,000 USD) required for each foreign film, and a reduction in compulsory cash
‘contributions’ (less than $170,000 USD) to the film industry development fund for each
imported film title (Pagano, 1985). Film quotas were seen to be obstructing MPEA’s ‘right’
to greater access. It is not surprising, then, that the MPEA was using the USTR and its expert
negotiation tactics to influence amendments to the MPL, which the Korean government said
were coming soon.4 MPEA grumbles came at an opportune time because of the new
prospects for contemporary art and international cultural exchange opened by President
Chun’s Ministry of Culture and Information. In the lead-up to the 1988 Seoul Olympics
increased government spending on arts and culture grew by leaps and bounds, which diverted
attention away from the military dictatorship and created an improved image of Chun’s
regime. An open window for the direct distribution of US films – closed since 1961 – was
potentially about to be forced wide open.
In October 1985 the MPEA withdrew its formal complaints against the Korean government
(Variety, 1985). One month later, the Ministry of Culture and Information, through an
expected amendment to the MPL, proposed to reduce the minimum number of screening days
for domestic films from an all-time high of 165 to 146, and to provide an additional 28-day
reduction of the SQS on a special-needs basis. It also promised US film companies could
open direct distribution offices and service cinemas, TV stations and videotape rental
businesses without restraint. Once modified, the MPL would also allow Korean producerdistributors to import one foreign film for every four they made (MPEA, 1988). Effectively,
this would have given the Korean film industry a protective bastion for the creation and
expression of Korean culture. Despite congenial intentions between the US and Korea, the
round of negotiations in 1985 failed to produce the outcome the MPEA was looking for; the
Korean government had decided to safeguard the domestic film industry further by not
yielding to MPEA demands. In late 1986 the Korean legislature aborted liberal agreements
made in 1985. Once again the MPEA was denied full access to the Korean market, one of the
world’s fastest-developing film markets, predicted to yield upwards of 40 million USD in
rental billings (Park with Segers, 1988). The giant MPEA and US government’s economic
approach to films as goods was weakened before the much smaller Korean government and
film industry’s view of film as national culture worthy of protecting at all cost.
Since MPEA’s formation in 1945, its representatives have appeared frequently before the US
Congress to speak against international trade blockades. Valenti’s dramatic testimony and
that of MPEA President Eric Johnston before him presented life and death scenarios, from
which the American film and potentially all industries might suffer. Archive documents and
4

Throughout the 1980s the Performance Ethics Committee (PEC), Korea’s primary
censorship organization, was also ‘hindering’ the distribution of Hollywood films because it
mandated only one foreign film could be censored at any given time. This was a key method
to maintain centralized control over the dissemination of foreign media content. MPEA
complaints were directed at the PEC’s practice of taking 2-3 months to approve a foreign film
– a process potentially equaling an annual screen quota of 4-6 films.
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trade reports show throughout the mid-to-late 1980s, Valenti and the MPEA became
increasingly frustrated with the Korean market, speaking at numerous congressional hearings;
Valenti literally wanted to hit the Korean government ‘across the head with a 2 by 4, that is,
with a wooden plank (Valenti 1986: 1003). According to Valenti: ‘Unless something is
turned around to make sure that the old phrase ‘no pain, no gain’ must be an instruction given
to foreign countries that if they persist in hedge rowing their borders, they are going to have
some injury that they are not going to like’ (Valenti 1986: 1004). Fussing over Korea made
sense because it was seen as a ‘potential sleeping giant for extracting license fees for indie
English language films’ (Hollinger, 1988a). In addition, about 40,000 US troops stationed in
Korea were considered a patriotic bonus, that is, a sizeable, captive audience for American
films (Variety, 1987b). The US government heard the influential testimony of Valenti and
other industry leaders like him loud and clear, revamping trade laws in 1988 and giving the
US government power to revoke a country’s trade status if any American industry or
commodity experienced ongoing trade barriers. Korea was a tiger in slumber about to be
wakened.
In order to maintain trade status with the US, the newly-elected President Roh Tae-woo
government (1988-93) capitulated to MPEA demands, ushering Hollywood distributors
through an opening that had been closed tightly to insulate Korea from external – mostly
ideological – influences. Yet, Korea became more Hollywood-friendly each time a new
President came to power. According to MPL amendments enacted in 1987, MPEA member
companies could open branch offices in Seoul and directly distribute Hollywood films.
Twentieth Century Fox and United International Pictures (UIP) – a collaboration between
Universal, Paramount and MGM/United Artists – were the first distributors to set up shop
(Hollinger, 1988b). The Korean cinema was expanding from the outside in. Yet, the SQS
during President Roh’s administration remained fortified; his Ministry of Culture mandated
that every cinema screen domestic films for a minimum of 106 days a year or 29 percent of
total screening days. Although the integrity of the SQS had been preserved by the
government’s neoliberal economic and cultural policies, US distributors now had greater
access to Korean audiences – a hostile foray that would soon encounter aggressive and
highly-organized resistance.

Snakes in the Dark, 1988-2006
Korea has the potential to become one of the largest markets for U.S. motion pictures in Asia,
second only to Japan where U.S. motion picture companies now earn some $500,000,000
annually. (Valenti, 1989: 256).
In September 1988, purposely around the time of the Olympic Games and shortly after UIP
opened its direct-distribution office, hundreds of directors, producers, distributors, stars,
cultural protection advocates, literary groups, opposition government party members,
academics and film students protested against Hollywood majors’ penetration of Korea by
marching in the Myongdong ‘peace district’ area of Seoul. This was the first of many highlyorganized events, seeking to raise the world’s attention to the fight to protect Korea’s film
industry. There was no better time to speak to the world than during the Olympics, which was
broadcast to millions and millions of homes. Protestors picketed in front of Seoul cinemas
screening Fatal Attraction, a blatantly violent story about adultery. Red signs screamed:
‘Yankee, go home’ and ‘Down With American Movies’, drawing a frenzy of media attention
(Park with Segers, 1988). Protests called for a boycott of Fatal Attraction and other directlydistributed American films because they were seen as a cultural invasion and a threat to
Korea’s national film industry. Of dire concern was the prospect of Korea’s film industry
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falling into the grip of US companies that would suck any and all profits out of the country.
Korea was seen from the inside as a host to a foreign beast capable of stealing part of the
country’s livelihood. What these protests couldn’t possibly see, however, was how the Rho
government’s approval of Hollywood’s latest inroads to Korea would facilitate international
cultural exchange and impact positively on Korean film culture in general and the whole of
the film industry.
Strikers released snakes in two cinemas screening Fatal Attraction, hoping to scare away
patrons who might not agree with the protest or understand its ramifications (Farhi, 1988;
Kramer, 1988). Riot police kept protesters at bay as relations between the KMPPC, Ministry
of Culture and MPEA heated to new levels. Valenti saw the boycott threats and the cries to
close American film distribution offices as ‘simply deplorable’ (Variety, 1988), and believed
Korea’s film distributors were ‘literally defying their government’ and making it
‘economically impossible for US exporters to operate distribution offices’ (Associated Press ,
1988; MPEA, 1988). In late September 1988, Valenti lodged a new round of complaints of
‘unfair’ trade with the USTR, once again accusing Korea of hindering the distribution of US
films. Naturally the MPEA and other US industries had a definition of ‘unfair’ that few
nations agreed with. The MPEA was doing everything it could to cement its access to the
Korean market, which it considered a ‘gold mine’ (Segers, 1988). For the US, any country
impeding the importation and distribution of American films prevented the US film and
television industry from maintaining its $1.2 billion a year in surplus balance of trade (cited
in Valenti 1986: 989). For staunch supporters of Korea’s film industry, there was fear US
pictures would dominate the market. Initially it probably looked that way too because in 1985
only 30 foreign films were imported, while in 1988 the figure radically increased five-fold to
176. Threats from the US worked. After six weeks of intense negotiations, Valenti withdrew
MPEA’s formal complaints. President Rho’s Ministry of Culture capitulated and granted the
MPEA free and immediate access to Korea’s film, television and videotape markets. Film
quota restrictions were reduced, and censorship measures limiting the number of films and
film prints were removed. Steps were taken to prevent demonstrations and boycotts of the
direct distribution of US films in Seoul and other cities (Harris, 1988; MPAA, 1988). The
Rho government had opened the floodgates for change, and the MPEA relentlessly barrelled
forward with a brood of films – though much smaller in number than between 1926 and
1936.
Throughout the 1990s the SQS remained intact as a law, though notable Korean scholars such
as Cho (2003) have questioned its relevancy and efficacy. The number of imported films
jumped from 264 in 1989 to 382 in 1994, and reached a peak of 402 in 1996 (Korean
Cinema, 1998: 70; Korean Cinema, 2000: 265). Theoretically, the SQS protected domestic
films regardless of their mass appeal (or lack thereof). Yet in reality some exhibitors refused
to screen domestic films in numbers as required by the SQS; there was more money to be
made by screening imported films. Hence the formation in 1993 of the Coalition for Cultural
Diversity in Moving Images (CDMI, formerly known as the Screen Quota Watch Group),
which aimed to ensure the survival of the SQS – as if it were the industry’s most important
safeguard. The CDMI emerged at a time when other countries, such as France, were
mounting fervent opposition to incorporate ‘audiovisual industries’ in GATT. Since its
formation, CDMI meticulously has calculated the total number of screening days for
domestic films while actively participating in international meetings of cultural professional
organizations (Yang, 2004). Along with the Korean Film Council (KOFIC, known as
KMPPC before 1993) and thousands of other film industry people, CDMI has urged the
Korean government to de-link the SQS, that is, remove culture from ongoing bilateral
investment treaty negotiations with the US.
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It is common knowledge that the MPEA/MPAA has continued its efforts to topple the SQS as
it has done in many other countries. However, this has not been an easy task in Korea partly
because the edges of Valenti’s sharp intelligence system have dulled. From 25-28 March
1999, Valenti accompanied US Secretary of Commerce, William M. Daley, and 16 other
American industry leaders to Korea on a business development mission. US-DOS archive
documents reveal Valenti used obsolete statistics to convince the Kim Dae-jung government
the SQS was damaging the Korean film industry by dragging down numbers of cinemagoers
and cinemas as well as box office receipts. This so-called crisis could be alleviated and
replaced with a ‘renaissance’ for the Korean cinema by organizing a series of training
workshops and $500 million USD dollars in US and Australian investments for new
multiplexes, which Valenti was happy to facilitate. President Kim appreciated Valenti’s good
will, but in reality, there was no crisis; cinemas actually increased by 10 in the period 1997-8
and the number of cinemagoers exceeded 50 million for the same period (Korean Cinema,
2003: 320). Furthermore, no-one in the US (or Korea for that matter) could have possibly
anticipated the extraordinary success of Kang Je-gyu’s blockbuster Shiri (1999), which pulled
$25 million at the box office and outsold Titanic to become the then-top-selling Korean film
of all time. One could argue the increase of imported films had helped to expand the Korean
film industry. The Korean cinema rose on its tiger’s paws to never-before-seen heights. By
April 2000, Hollywood distributors were reportedly learning lessons from the Korean film
industry and releasing US films at times that avoided vigorous competition from Korean
blockbusters (Segers, 2000). In-deed the renaissance had come, but on Korean terms and in a
Korean way.
Conclusion: Fatal Attractions in Everlasting Affairs
Since its inception in 1945 MPEA-MPAA’s sphere of influence has strengthened by Jack
Valenti’s ability to make cultural industry issues significant agenda items in larger
international trade negotiations, such as GATT in the 1970s and 1980s, NAFTA in the 1990s,
and more recent bilateral and free trade agreements. In Korea, since 1985, Valenti and the
MPEA have embraced the USTR decision to hold SQS restrictions as a core bargaining chip
in larger trade talks. That having been said, , the case study of the MPEA and US
government’s historical actions and reactions toward import and screen quotas in Korea is
business as usual, because it is normally how the US resolves trade issues. The MPEA and
thus American government’s power to influence cultural matters, or the politics of culture, in
foreign markets through trade avenues is overwhelming. The MPEA’s success in prying open
Korea over time has resulted from creating wedges of disagreement between different parts
of the Korean government. For the Korean Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of
Economics, the choice between an economic recovery package from the US and favourable
tariff treatment for Korean goods, and protecting the local film industry is an easy one to
make. For others such as the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the whole of the Korean
film industry, bilateral negotiations concerning Korea’s economy are inappropriate places to
leverage audiovisual industry quotas and protectionist cultural policies. This is not simply
another example of Hollywood majors’ supreme overseas campaign thoroughly illustrated by
Vasey (1997), Jarvie (1992) and Thompson (1985) because it suggests the opening of Korea
to US films in the late 1980s eventually (and ironically) helped the Korean cinema achieve
international recognition for its success. For a considerable time the SQS remained a
recognizable force in the protection and promotion of the Korean film industry and Korean
culture more generally by forcing exhibitors to screen domestic films even when profits were
unexpected.
Korea’s ‘David and Goliath’ story was spotlighted at the October 2005 General Conference
of UNESCO meeting in Paris. The Korean case was used as one of the primary catalysts in
the pursuit of an international policy instrument – the Convention on the Protection and
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Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression – designed to enable member nation states
to reinforce cultural diversity and protect cultural contents and artistic expressions while
facing international trade giants such as China and the US. After the meeting, advocates for
cultural diversity in Korea were ecstatic because the UNESCO Convention reaffirmed their
efforts to withstand economic imperatives to sacrifice the SQS in ongoing trade agreements
with the US. However, the real-world effects of this UNESCO policy are yet to be seen, and
may be of little help. In January 2006, three months after the UNESCO meeting, the Roh
Moo-hyun government (2003 to present) halved the SQS after 40 years of pressure from the
US. The American film industry hopes to benefit from the removal of half of a great thorn
that has been disturbing its presence in the Asian market since the mid-1960s. While a vast
majority of UNESCO member states have embraced an intangible notion of culture and the
need for strong national cultural policy to protect it, the US has moved in the opposite
direction arguing against the need for a country other than the US to protect its locallyproduced cultural goods. This is a watershed moment that may or may not be host to the
continuation of Korea’s film boom.
In defence of the MPEA (and MPAA after they merged) the escalation of Hollywood films in
Korea encouraged the birth of a new generation of cinemagoers among a host of other
variables that have led to the roaring success of the contemporary Korean cinema. Along the
way, the MPEA saw the Korean cinema as a highly-lucrative market – a point the Korean
film industry and millions of Koreans began seeing for themselves after the box office smash
Shiri. Yet, Hollywood’s influential role in the domestic market has not been a fait accompli,
and the so-called gold mine has had its share of challenges and obstacles, including the
acquisition of screen time due to ongoing limitations of the SQS, building of additional and
more modern (expensive) cinemas and high import duties, to name a few. Numerous protests
in Korea have continued alongside political, economic and cultural negotiations. Former
President Kim Dae-jung as well as President Roh Moo-hyun’s government stalled bilateral
trade talks by not readily signing agreements, and more than 700 advocates for the SQS,
including high-profile producers, directors, actors and students from Korea and other
international directors such as Roland Joffe, Agnes Varda, Jean-Luc Godard, Wong Kar-Wai
and Ken Loach have protested what they consider ‘U.S. cultural and economic imperialism’
(Screen International, 1999; Schilling, 1999). The core debate surrounding the SQS is ‘free
vs. fair trade’. But questions of massive, long-term profits from film rentals, as evidenced by
the research in this study, are on the minds of Hollywood distributors. Oddly, though perhaps
not surprisingly, MPAA representatives such as Hugh Stephens, TimeWarner Senior Vice
President of International Relations and Public Policy-Asia Pacific, have used the cultural
diversity argument recently with the Chinese government to justify the need for more US
films in China (Stephens, 2005). The Korean case is being used to demonstrate the benefits of
increasing US film distributors’ access to the Chinese market and to argue for further
restructuring of China’s domestic film industry. That is, the liberalization of Chinese film
policy is being sold as the key for China to develop a robust, dynamic motion picture industry
– as Korea has done. Clearly there are implications for both Korea and the US’s future
relationships with China in terms of film trade.
To the credit of Jack Valenti and the MPAA, one can argue the popularity and critical
acclaim of contemporary Korean cinema has been a combined by-product of the MPL’s
attempts in 1985 to liberalize the market with free competition and freedom of expression
regarding censorship, as well as Hollywood majors’ aggressive efforts to develop overseas
markets in the Asia-Pacific. That is, the increased distribution and exhibition of US films in
Korea has had an enormous impact on local industry practices as well as the tens of millions
of Koreans who now support their own films by watching them at the cinema. We will never
know if this phenomenon could have happened earlier, for instance, in the late 1960s when
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the MPEA first pleaded with the Park government to open Korea’s heart to more American
films. Suffice it to say, however, that if this had happened, Korea might be celebrating the
Pusan International Film Festival’s 40th anniversary in 2006. Perhaps it is not so ironic, then,
that the liberalization of the Korean market and its opening to the direct distribution of
foreign films has led to the rising strength of the contemporary Korean cinema. With the
onslaught of foreign films since the late 1980s, new cinemas had to be built and a whole new
generation of moviegoers was born. In the last decade the number of screens grew by 250
percent (from 577 in 1995 to 1451 in 2004) in order to meet this demand (Korean Cinema,
2005: 396). Unexpectedly, it was this new generation that has become a crucial variable,
making Korean films popular in their own domestic market.
MPEA’s relentless attempts to whittle away Korea’s protectionist SQS to little or nothing
constitute a complex affair with one of the few film industries that has persevered against the
strength of the American film industry. Today, the Hollywood hegemony continues to apply
intense pressures on the Korean film industry not only to limit the number of domestic films
screened, but more importantly to create a completely unrestricted environment for the
distribution of digital content. To this end, the halving of the SQS in mid-2006 shows the US
has gained solid ground. Though future outcomes of free trade negotiations are uncertain, the
history of cinema in Korea has proven the local film industry is an economic and cultural
asset worth fighting for – for both sides of the negotiating table.
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